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Abstract 
The paper discusses the role of regional public goods vs. global goods in influencing post-
communist transition in Central and Eastern Europe and former USSR with special attention 
given to three particular factors: (i) external anchoring of national reform process; (ii) 
international trade arrangements and (iii) international financial stability.  
Our main finding is that that the EU, through the Eastern enlargement process, acted as the 
very effective regional public (club) good provider, whose influence across time and countries 
was correlated with better transition outcomes. In particular, the consolidation phase in 
democratization, institution building and structural transformation was successful in countries 
reforming under EU accession conditionality, but not under other forms of conditionality 
provided, for example, by the Bretton Woods institutions, . In the area of trade, gains from 
WTO accession were dwarfed by the impact of the opening of the EU trading block for 
accession countries. Finally, countries participating in EU integration showed more discipline 
in maintaining macroeconomic stability, while IMF programs were less effective in inducing 
stability in the absence of the European factor.  
This the main reason why CIS countries which got neither the EU accession perspective, nor 
even trade liberalization offer on the EU lag behind Central European, Baltic and Balkan 
countries in terms of democratization, rule of law, institutional stability and market-oriented 
economic reforms. However, due to observed ‘enlargement fatigue’ in the incumbent EU, the 
future attractiveness of the EU integration perspective and strength of the accession-
associated incentive system (in respect to countries of Western Balkans, CIS and Turkey) 
comes under question. There is also unclear whether European experience in providing 
regional public goods can be easily repeated in other geographic regions and to which 
extended can be used by the providers of global public goods.  
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Introduction 
 
The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s saw the rapid collapse of the 
communist regimes of the former Soviet bloc1. This happened first in Central and Eastern 
Europe in 1989 with the Round Table agreement and the electoral victory of the Solidarity 
movement in Poland, gradual political liberalization in Hungary, the fall of the GDR and the 
Berlin Wall, the Velvet Revolution in the former Czechoslovakia, the roundtable agreement 
between Communist Party and opposition in Bulgaria, and the bloody uprising against the 
Ceausescu regime in Romania. Then, two years later, the political monopoly of communist 
parties was broken in Albania, part of the former Yugoslavia, and the former USSR.  
Figure 1. GDP evolution (1991=100) 
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Source: EBRD Transition Report, various issues. 
After the communist system collapsed, all post-communist countries faced the difficult 
challenge of political and economic transition to democracy and modern capitalism. While 
former Soviet satellites in Central Europe and the Baltic republics managed to carry out this 
process quickly and at relatively low economic and social cost, and were rewarded with the 
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2004 EU accession, other countries went through much more difficult and painful 
transformations, accomplishing less in economic and social terms and paying higher prices 
than their more advanced neighbors. Among this relatively disadvantaged group the Balkan 
countries have performed better in terms of economic and political reforms than have the 
twelve former Soviet republics formally belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). GDP evolution in these three groups of countries is presented in figure 1.  
Many comparative studies seek to analyze the causes of such differentiated transition 
outcomes. They refer to differences in starting conditions (the role of the Soviet structural, 
institutional and cultural legacy), ethnic conflicts, transition strategies adopted at the 
beginning of transition, domestic politics and many other factors2. Most of these address the 
role of national policy choices and national institutions even if they attempt to group countries 
according to similar criteria or into regional subgroups.  
While skipping the ‘classical’ discussion on the role of various transition strategies 
and national factors determining choice of strategy, we would like to concentrate on the role 
of the international environment in determining this choice. We would like to focus our 
attention on three particular factors: (i) external anchoring of national reform process; (ii) 
international trade arrangements and (iii) international financial stability. If we understand the 
concept of the international public good (IPG) as ‘public goods whose benefits reach across 
borders’ (see Kaul, 2002) we will deal in this paper with the role of IPGs in determining 
transition process outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the former 
USSR. This research agenda is justified by the active involvement of international 
organizations in policymaking across transition countries.  
According to classical definition (Samuelson, 1954) public goods are non-rival (i.e. 
consumption by one person does not reduce consumption opportunities for others) and non-
excludable (i.e. nobody can be prevented from consumption). Consequently, ‘international 
public goods (IPG) can be defined as a good, once provided, that has largely 
                                                                                                                                                        
1
 This is the revised and updated version of the paper presented at the Conference on ‘International Public Goods 
for Economic Development’ organized by the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, 
at Cambridge, Ma on September 7-8, 2005, which was part of the UNIDO project on the same topic. Authors 
would like to thank participants of this conference for their interesting and critical remarks as well as the 
participants of the seminar at the Birkbeck College, University of London in August 2005 for their comments on an 
early draft of this paper. Funding provided by UNIDO through the Instituto Complutense de Estudios 
Internacionales (ICEI) in Madrid, Spain allowed us to work on this important topic. Our CASE colleagues James 
Cabot, Vitalij Dorofeyev and Henryk Kalinowski provided an excellent research and editorial assistance, which 
helped to prepare this paper. However, the authors bear the sole responsibility for the content and quality of this 
paper as well as for presented opinions and policy recommendations.  
2
 See, among others, Aslund (1994); Aslund (2002); Aslund, Boone, and Johnson (1996); Balcerowicz (1994); 
Balcerowicz and Gelb (1995); de Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996); Dabrowski (1996); Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh 
(1996); Havrylyshyn et al. (2000); Fischer and Sahay (2001); Stiglitz (1999a, 1999 b); Dabrowski, Gomulka and 
Rostowski (2001); Mau (2000); WEO (2000); EBRD (1999; 2000); World Bank (2002).  
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global/international (even regional) non-rival and non-excludable benefits. National public 
goods (NPG), once provided, benefit largely, if not entirely, the residents of the country in 
question’ (ODI, 2000). From this theoretical perspective none of the three factors analyzed in 
our paper can be considered as a pure international public good. These kinds of goods are 
perhaps better defined as ‘club’ goods (Buchanan, 1965 and Cornes and Sandler, 1996). In 
the case of club goods, members are tempted to maximize their utility by restricting 
membership, which leads to insufficient supply. This characteristic seems to reflect 
particularly well the nature of the regional integration block – the European Union – that has 
chosen to provide mentioned goods to some, but not all, transition economies3. In this 
respect, global institutions were more willing to provide these goods in a more non-
discriminatory fashion. Our discussion will be therefore concentrated on the relative 
importance of the delivery of regional club vs. global public goods.  
Our paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 focuses on the relative role of 
the EU as a provider of external anchoring of reforms. Section 3 compares the role of the 
WTO and regional trade initiatives. Section 4 analyzes the role of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) as a provider of international financial stability. Section 5 discusses prospects of 
regional goods delivery in Europe and other geographical regions. Section 6 offers summary 
of findings.  
1. External anchoring of national reform process 
 
Given the scope and scale of distortions, wide geographical coverage and 
differentiated initial conditions, transition has provided a new impetus to the study of growth 
inducing policies. Differentiated results among countries following the recommendations of 
the Washington Consensus (including macroeconomic stabilization, internal and external 
liberalization and privatization) surprised observers and pointed to the importance of 
previously overlooked institutional factors4. Ex post this conclusion seems natural, since 
institutional reforms were at the core of the transition towards democracy and market 
economy. But institution building processes proved more difficult than expected. Systematic 
failures in many countries focused attention on the political economy of reforms, incentives 
and country ownership. This evolution of thinking about factors most crucial to successful 
transition is represented in figure 2. This new paradigm is relevant for the discussion of the 
                                                 
3
 See the analysis of NATO expansion in the context of club goods theory in Sandler and Hartley (1999). 
4
 See the brief review of the broader debate on the role of institutions in Rodrik (2004). 
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role of IPG. Although most important institutions have a national character and must be 
created through the domestic political process, transition experience has shown that external 
factors can play an important role that we define, following Berglof and Roland (1997), as 
external anchoring of reforms. 
Figure 2. Main factors of successful transition 
Policies
Politics
Institutions
Evolution in 
thinking 
about 
transition
Washington Consensus
stabilization, liberalization, privatization
Post-Washington Consensus
rule of law, governance, regulation
Reform Ownership
Political process behind reforms
 
 
The literature on political economy of reform explains why external anchoring might 
be important or, in other words, why anchoring reforms domestically is not always possible 
(see Rodrik, 1996 and Fukuyama, 2004 for overview). Dewatripont and Roland (1992) argue 
that policymakers face two sets of policy constraints. Ex ante political constraints might 
prevent reforms from being implemented. Not only aggregate but also individual uncertainty 
about the results of reforms can prove an essential barrier to reforms (Fernandez and Rodrik, 
1991). Ex post political constraints deal with the possibility of policy reversal. The two 
constraints are not always independent; some reforms are not successfully implemented 
because of the risk of future reversal. Attempts to impose hard budget constraints, for 
example, or to shed labor by compensating job losers, can fail due to time inconsistency 
problems. Schleifer et al (1993) and Roland and Verdier (2003) show how multiple equilibria 
can arise in the transition process due to interactions between incentives to become 
producers or predators and costs of law enforcement.  
External anchoring can have a benevolent role in overcoming these problems5. Such 
role of external factors is not new to the debate in development economics. On the contrary, 
it has been hotly debated in the literature on external conditionality6. While unconditioned 
                                                 
5
 Obviously, the reform process is not impossible without external anchoring. China and Vietnam provide 
important (although somewhat controversial because of the authoritarian nature of their political regimes) 
examples of the success of a self-anchored transition process.  
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foreign aid often discourages reforms (Sachs, 1994; Casella and Eichengreen, 1996), the 
role of traditional conditionality is to make sure countries do not delay necessary changes. 
Unlike conditionality that is quite often associated with imposing reforms, we define external 
anchoring as promoting both supply and genuine demand for reforms. Nevertheless, external 
anchoring requires giving up some aspects of sovereignty and it is rare that any country is 
willing to do so in respect to any other country, especially a bigger and more powerful 
neighbor (e.g. Mexico vis-à-vis US). As a result, external anchoring in most cases cannot be 
provided through bilateral relations but calls for international collective action.  
In transition countries, most external anchoring of reforms was provided by two types 
of actors: regional institutions (the EU and NATO) and global institutions (the IMF, the World 
Bank and the WTO). The relative influence of regional and global institutions has been 
different in various countries. For Central Eastern Europe, the Baltics and, increasingly, the 
Balkans, regional integration has proven essential and very effective in providing external 
anchoring. In contrast, the CIS countries have depended exclusively on global institutions 
with much less satisfactory results. In discussion below we focus on the two most important 
providers of external anchoring: the EU and the IMF7. 
 1.1. The role of the EU integration process 
Below we describe the external anchoring provided within the European integration 
process through incentives, conditions and monitoring. Figure 3 presents the main stages of 
this process. 
For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia - countries that started 
reforms first and implemented them forcefully and decisively, European integration was the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6
For discussion, see: Easterly (2001), IMF (2001), Drazen & Isard (2004). 
7
 In the discussion below, we will not comment on the anchoring role of some other important regional and global 
organizations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most influential and effective regional 
security organization in the world and, for a number of transition countries, with the dominant strategic goal of 
‘coming back to the West’, joining NATO was equally, if not more, important a stimulus for reforms in the political 
sphere as was EU accession. WTO has not been important so far in providing external anchoring. For countries 
participating in the EU integration process, EU institutions and conditionality have overriding character compared 
with the WTO’s more narrow and weaker conditionality (see also Section 3 of this paper). This role has changed, 
to some extent, in the case of big CIS countries such as Russia, Ukraine or Kazakhstan, now applying to become 
WTO members. For them some WTO entry requirements - avoiding import discrimination in indirect taxation, 
adjustment of domestic energy prices, protection of intellectual property rights, opening of financial sector to 
foreign investors – play a helpful role in determining domestic reform agenda. The World Bank was very active in 
virtually all transition countries and provided both financial resources and technical advice for reform process. 
However, its external anchoring impact was smaller than that of the IMF for two reasons. First, WB adjustment 
lending decisions are usually dependent on getting a prior IMF ‘stamp of approval’, i.e. satisfying the IMF 
conditionality. Second, WB adjustment lending offers usually much smaller amounts than IMF loans. The impact 
of other international organizations like OECD, BIS, UNDP, OSCE, Council of Europe was either marginal or 
purely sectoral.  
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strategic direction from day one of transition. However, the very first phase of reforms was 
driven less by specific consideration about accession strategy than by the general 
enthusiasm about parting with communism, building a ‘normal society’ and reintegrating with 
the ‘free world’. This period, known as the ‘honeymoon’ or ‘period of extraordinary politics’ 
(Balcerowicz, 1994), could not last long and the consolidation of reforms required further fuel. 
Fortunately, the strong desire to ‘come back to the west’ (Mizsei, 2004) was welcomed by the 
European Economic Community (European Union since 1993), which signed comprehensive 
Europe Association Agreements with these countries in 1991. At this moment, newly 
associate countries had already managed to build the fundamentals of democracy and free 
market economy, however sustainability of reforms was still questionable, while the 
macroeconomic situation was dismal and the prospect for further progress uncertain. What 
association agreements signaled was a clear commitment to enlargement. This commitment 
was, however, linked to the conditionality formulated in Copenhagen in 1993.  
Figure 3. Timetable of EU integration process of post-communist countries 
1990 1995 2000 2005
Czech
Hungary
Poland
Estonia
Slovenia
Slovakia
Latvia
Lithuania
Romania
Bulgaria
Croatia
Macedonia
Albania
BiH, Kosovo
Montenegro, Serbia 
Associate* Applicant Negotiating Member
 
* Europe Association Agreement (CEECs and  Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania), Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (Croatia, Macedonia and Albania). EAA was first signed by Czechoslovakia and then by 
Czech and Slovak Republics. 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index_en.html 
The Copenhagen conditionality (box 1) was vague and imprecise, which gave some 
observers the impression that it was lax. However, in subsequent years, it proved to be 
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extremely demanding because of its open-ended character. It was also made clear during 
the summit in Madrid in 1995, that administrative capacity and true implementation would be 
assessed (Gotisan et al., 2004). As a result, the Copenhagen criteria continued to anchor 
reforms in the region for the next ten years, while the EU continued to play the membership 
carrot and stick game, promoting reform consolidation and deepening in the region, equally 
for countries that started to reform later and for whom prospect of membership, both because 
of geopolitical and economic reasons, seemed initially more distant but not less desirable. 
The Baltics, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, all signed Europe Agreement agreements with 
the EC within three years of the Copenhagen summit and, by 1996, all Central European and 
Baltic states, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, had applied for EU membership. 
Box 1. Copenhagen Criteria for EU Accession, June 1993 
‘Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume obligations 
of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required. Membership 
requires: 
• stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities, 
• the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, 
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union.’ 
Source: Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council, Copenhagen, 21-22 June, 1993, SN 180/93. 
Agenda 2000, adopted by the EU in Luxembourg in 1997, confirmed the commitment 
to enlargement, but also showed a strong signal that the EU would not tolerate quick 
accession of countries lagging in the political, economic and administrative reform process. 
In fact it was concluded after a detailed review of each applicant state that none of them 
(some in the 8th year of the transition process at this time!) fully satisfied the Copenhagen 
criteria. Nevertheless, five countries were allowed to start accession negotiations - Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (we refer to these countries in the rest of 
this paper as the Luxembourg group). Opening negotiations did not imply automatic 
membership, however. It meant merely that they ‘could be in a position to satisfy all the 
conditions for membership in the medium term if they maintain and strongly sustain their 
efforts of preparation’8.  
The progress of economic and institutional reforms in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Romania was assessed as not satisfactory enough to open negotiations, while Slovakia was 
excluded from the Luxembourg group because of the democratic deficit under the Meciar 
regime. The stick of exclusion was visibly presented. This, together with exclusion from the 
                                                 
8
 Agenda 2000, EC Cons Doc 9984/97, Vol. I, Part Two (VII).  
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NATO process, led to a democratic regime change in Slovakia, which energetically 
transformed its political scene and accelerated economic reforms. The new reform effort was 
also taken in remaining four countries, particularly impressing in Bulgaria after a deep 
financial and political crisis in 1996-1997. Accordingly, the EU enlargement strategy was 
modified at the summit in Helsinki to reflect the view that, at that moment, a carrot rather than 
a stick was the more effective tool with which to promote reform (compare quotes in box 2). 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia were all allowed to start negotiations in 
2000 (we refer to these countries in the rest of this paper as the Helsinki group). 
Box 2. New Accession Strategy, Helsinki 1999 
• ‘The risk in taking this ‘hard line’ approach is that the countries concerned, having 
already made great efforts and sacrifices, will become disillusioned and turn their 
backs on us. Their economic policies will begin to diverge, and an historic opportunity 
will have been lost - perhaps forever’ 
• ‘The time has come to inject new momentum into the enlargement process and give a 
strong signal of its [the Commission’s] determination to bring this process forward as 
quickly as possible’. 
• ‘Negotiations should be opened in 2000 with all candidate countries which meet the 
political criteria for membership and have proved to be ready to take the necessary 
measures to comply with the economic criteria’ 
 
Source: Romano Prodi, speech to European Parliament, 13 October 1999, Speech/99/130 at: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi and European Commission, Composite Paper, EC Cons Doc 12053/99, 13 
October 1999. 
But if this carrot proved effective, it was only because the stick was firmly in the hands 
of the European Commission. Negotiations proved difficult. Annual progress reports 
prepared by the Commission were often critical, with candidate countries being reminded on 
many occasions that the opening of negotiations did not necessarily lead to early accessions, 
and with the European Commission revisiting issues previously believed to have been 
resolved, according to the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed (see box 
3 below). Negotiations allowed the European Commission to effectively monitor the 
comprehensive process of institutional quality improvements in all major areas of public 
functions (Roland, 2005).  
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Box 3. EU Accession negotiations 
• ‘The decision to enter into negotiations does not imply that they will be successfully 
concluded at the same time. Their conclusion and the subsequent accession of the 
different applicant States will depend on the extent to which each complies with the 
Copenhagen criteria and on the Union’s ability to assimilate new members’ 
• ‘The decision to close chapters provisionally has generally been taken according to 
the following criteria: full acceptance of the EU acquis, absence of requests for 
transitional periods, satisfactory answers to EU questions. Moreover, the EU, while 
accepting provisional closure, has insisted on the global character of the negotiations 
(nothing is agreed until everything is agreed), as well as on the need for satisfactory 
progress in the preparations for accession in each of the candidate countries. In this 
respect the EU side announced that it will monitor progress under each chapter 
throughout the negotiations.’ 
• In the course of negotiations the European Commission has been monitoring 
progress of implementation of acquis communautaire in following chapters (areas): 
Free Movement of Goods, Persons, Services and Capital, Company Law, 
Competition, Agriculture, Fisheries, Transport, Taxation, EMU, Statistics, Social 
Policy, Energy, Industry, Small and Medium Enterprises, Science and Research, 
Education and Training, Telecommunications, Cultural and Audiovisual Matters, 
Regional Policy, Environment, Consumer and Health Protection, Justice and Home 
Affairs, Customs Union, External Relations, CFSP, Financial Control, Financial and 
Budgetary Provisions and Institutions. 
Sources: Luxembourg European Council, December 1997, Presidency Conclusions, para 26 and European 
Commission, Composite Paper, Reports on progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries, EC 
Cons Doc 12053/99, 13 October 1999, p 32. 
Having successfully concluded negotiation, eight transition countries joined the 
European Union in May 2004. These countries not only included the Luxembourg group 
countries, but also Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, each of whom had accelerated reforms 
sufficiently to catch up with the progress of reforms, negotiations and the adoption of the 
acquis. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in January 2007. All these countries have made 
impressive progress in all sorts of reforms on their way to accession, as shown is figures 6-8. 
In the Western Balkans, EU accession opportunities followed the resolution of the 
Kosovo conflict and the establishment of the Stability Pact for South and Eastern Europe in 
1999. Macedonia was the first country to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA) in April 2001 and then obtained the EU candidate status in December 2005 (but it did 
not start EU accession negotiations yet. Croatia signed the SAA in October 2001, obtained 
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the EU candidate status in mid 2004, and started accession negotiations in October 2005. 
Albania signed the SAA in June 2006. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Kosovo are in various stages of SAA negotiations. The rapid acceleration of reforms in these 
countries is visible in figures 6-8. 
1.2. The role of the IMF 
Characteristically, all CIS countries have been excluded from the EU integration 
process. While some sort of cooperation between the EU and the CIS countries has been 
institutionalized in the form of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) and recently 
under the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)9, none of them has been 
considered eligible for the EU membership, even in the distant future.  
Figure 4. Disbursements under IMF programs: percent of country quota 
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Luxembourg group (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia), Helsinki group (Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia), Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and 
Montenegro), European CIS (Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine), Non-European CIS  (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).  
Source: own calculations based on IMF, Country Information, Transactions with the Fund, www.imf.org. 
As a result the international financial institutions have been the most important actors, 
attempting to provide external anchoring of reforms to CIS countries. This is particularly true 
of the IMF which, following the debt crisis of 1982, started to place ‘more emphasis on 
structural reforms and achievement of sustainable economic growth’ (IMF, 1987), and which 
seemed to be prepared to assume the responsibility of monitoring, managing, and supporting 
                                                 
9
 Which covers only part of the CIS region: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, potentially also 
Belarus. The EU also launched a mechanism of strategic partnership with Russia, similar to the ENP, which 
Russia does not want to be part of. See Section 5 of this paper on more discussion on ENP strengths and 
weaknesses.  
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the post-communist transition process. Most post-communist countries became members of 
this organization at the very beginning of their transition10. Long-lasting and active presence 
in the CIS countries and some other transition countries (see figure 4) has meant that the 
IMF has played the most prominent role in the post-communist economic transition process 
of all global international organizations and its conditionality has become an important 
reference point in domestic policymaking (Dabrowski, 1998; Gomulka, 1995). 
Figure 5 shows that, at the time of transition, the incidence of structural benchmarks 
in IMF supported programs indeed increased dramatically. Unfortunately, it is clear from 
figures 6-8 that CIS countries that were most exposed to IMF conditionality, reformed the 
least. Moreover, the period of peak of IMF structural conditionality in the second half of the 
1990s was a period of reform stagnation and even reversal in most countries.  
Figure 5. Average number of structural benchmarks for program (1987-1999) 
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Source: IMF (2001) 
1.3. Progress in political, institutional and structural reforms 
To illustrate these differences in the effectiveness of external anchoring we compare 
the results of transition across groups with different levels of engagement in the European 
integration process and IMF cooperation. Figures 6, 7 and 8 present the aggregate indicators 
of reforms in political, institutional and structural spheres, respectively. Among countries 
                                                 
10
 Four communist countries - the former Yugoslavia, Romania (from 1972), Hungary (from 1982) and Poland 
(from 1986) - belonged to the IMF earlier. However, with the exception of the former Yugoslavia, there were not 
Fund-supported programs in these countries.  
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involved in the EU accession process, we distinguish the ‘Luxembourg group’, ‘Helsinki 
group’ (see Section 2.1) and the Balkan countries which joined the EU integration process 
within the Stability Pact framework. CIS countries have all been excluded so far from the 
European integration process and so they were entirely dependent on international financial 
institutions to anchor reforms. Reflecting at least partly the heterogeneity of the group, we 
have split the CIS countries into European and non-European groups. In most instances, the 
European CIS have faced transition problems comparable to, although more intense than, 
other European transition economies, while for non-European CIS, these similarities are less 
obvious (lower level of initial development in Central Asia, oil discoveries in Caspian Sea 
countries, etc.). We shall analyze not only differences across countries but also in timing of 
reforms. 
Transition countries belonging to the ‘Luxembourg group’ achieved relatively high 
standards of democratization, quality of institutions and structural reforms early in the 
transition process. In the following years, all countries of this group consolidated these initial 
gains. While the goal of going back to the West guided these countries throughout the 
transition process, IMF programs were discontinued early in the transition process.  
For countries belonging to the ‘Helsinki group’, the reform progress was more 
uneven. The gap in democratization, institution building and structural policies temporarily 
increased, as some countries experienced periods of reform reversals. In particular, Slovakia 
experienced episodes of sharp political reversal under government of Vladimir Meciar (1994-
1998). However, the growing fear of being left aside from the EU and NATO accession for 
good helped Slovakia to produce one of the most spectacular political turnarounds after 1998 
parliamentary election. Slovakia not only managed to catch up with the Luxembourg 
countries in accession negotiations, but is viewed today as the leading reformer in the region.  
Latvia and Lithuania were devoted reformers, but compared to Estonia and given the 
level of post-Soviet distortions, the reform process was slower and less systematic. Again 
those countries managed to orchestrate sharp accelerations in reforms following the opening 
of the window of opportunity to join the EU together with the ‘Luxembourg group’ countries. 
Bulgaria, and especially Romania, proved to be rather reluctant reformers in the first years of 
the transition process. For those countries as well, the decisions taken in Luxembourg and 
Helsinki were instrumental in speeding up reforms.  
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Figure 6. Aggregate index of civil liberties and political rights 
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Country grouping: see description of figure 4 
Source: Freedom House, unweighted average of indices of political rights and civil liberties 
It shall be noted that the ‘Helsinki group’ that had a longer history of cooperation with 
the IMF, especially Bulgaria and Romania, exhibited the characteristic pattern of longer-term 
dependence on this organization. However, the role of international financial institutions was 
reduced substantially, once the EU accession process had been launched. 
Figure 7. World Bank Index of institutional quality 
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Country grouping: see description of figure 4 
Source: World Bank, Unweighted average of rule of law, government effectiveness, control of corruption and 
quality of regulation.  
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Figure 8. EBRD index of structural reforms  
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Country grouping: see description of figure 4 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports, various issues. Unweighted average of competition policy, enterprise reform, 
banking and non-banking financial sector reform 
In the Western Balkans, improvements in the political situation started to take place 
after 1999. Importantly, the end of the conflict and the fall of authoritarian regimes coincided 
with launching the Stability Pact for Southern Eastern Europe sponsored by the EU, which 
gave the Balkan countries a clear membership perspective. Subsequently, Serbia, and 
Montenegro democratized very rapidly, however strong improvements were also 
characteristic of Albania and Croatia. This period also marked the acceleration of structural 
reform with chances for moderate gains in institutional quality. These countries cooperated 
with the IMF throughout the transition process; however spectacular reform gains happened 
only when EU accession prospects had been opened. 
In summary, all countries involved in the European integration process seem to be 
converging to high standards of democratization and functional market economy, although 
the process is far from complete in the Western Balkans. Unfortunately, nothing can be less 
true about the direction of changes in CIS countries. This ‘great divide’ (Berglof and Bolton, 
2002) might be only partly explained by less favorable initial conditions in CIS countries.  
Indeed the start of reforms in these countries was relatively successful. Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the European CIS countries managed to build the fundaments 
of democratic societies and achieved standard comparable to that of the ‘Helsinki group’ and 
higher in comparison to the Balkans. In terms of structural reforms, these countries were 
almost at par with the ‘Helsinki group’ as late as 1995. However, all CIS countries failed to 
consolidate these early achievements. On the contrary, standards deteriorated and started to 
diverge from the European standards during the second half of the 1990s. Until the 2003-
2005 wave of democratic revolutions in the region, negative political tendencies 
characterized most CIS countries, although the reversal of democracy was strongest in 
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Central Asia and Belarus. This was accompanied by a stagnation in institutional quality and 
deceleration of structural reforms. All these negative developments happened in countries in 
which there was a strong presence of international financial institutions, but which were 
unconditionally excluded from the European integration process. 
1.4. Comparing EU and IMF conditionality 
Table 1 might provide some hints about what has made the EU so much more 
effective in anchoring reforms. We distinguish three factors: incentives, conditions and 
monitoring.  
The EU integration has been seen by accessing countries as a civilization upgrade 
with understandable, realistic and highly desirable benefits. Being inside or outside the EU 
could determine the fate of the nation and its people in the decades to come. Therefore, 
incentives to meet accession criteria could not have been stronger. Moreover the criteria 
themselves have been largely in line with popular desire to live in democratic, free market 
economies, ruled by law. It has been also well understood that accessing to the EU would be 
a difficult process and countries in non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria would not 
be admitted to the EU. As attention has been put on reform implementation and long-term 
progress, faking real actions through ‘paper reforms’ and only temporary improvements have 
been excluded.  
Characteristically, most countries involved in the European integration process 
managed to maintain consistent reform strategies despite unstable political environments, 
frequent elections and weak and short-lived coalition governments. In countries without the 
European anchor, political instability translated into policy inconsistency and reversals. 
Although Sachs (1994) underlines that the initial widespread desire to ‘return to Europe’ did 
not automatically translate into consensus on specific policies, the EU accession 
conditionality with subsequent progress reports provided much of the roadmap for reform 
consolidation and deepening. 
On the contrary, incentives to implement IMF programs in a consequent and 
consistent way are weak or non-existent. Some people obviously dislike the idea of 
cooperation with IFIs for political and ideological reasons; but, more importantly, the silent 
majority cannot see any obvious personal gains from its success. Attached conditions are 
either abstract (macroeconomics), highly technical or controversial (like privatization or 
restructuring of certain enterprises). What is even more important, the IMF programs (the 
same concerns the World Bank) do not touch at all political conditions and political 
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institutions while the latter have very often a strong impact on a quality of economic 
institutions and economic policies11.  
Table 1. Comparing EU and IMF conditionality 
EU accession criteria IMF program conditionality 
Incentives 
• strong carrot/ stick mechanism (EU 
membership/ exclusion) 
• important to public at large 
Incentives 
• weak carrot/stick mechanism (loan 
disbursement/ non-disbursement) 
• irrelevant to broader public 
Conditions 
• broadly defined (democracy, free 
market, European law) 
• strong public understanding and 
support 
Conditions 
•  narrowly defined (abstract macroeconomic, 
technical or specific structural benchmarks) 
• scant public understanding and support, 
opposing interest groups 
Monitoring 
• high credibility of enforcement (strong 
interest to keep non-performers outside 
EU) 
• full compliance required – ‘nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed’ 
(prevents paper reforms and policy 
reversals) 
• long term horizon (‘it will take as much 
time as needed’) 
Monitoring 
• low credibility of enforcement (IMF staff 
interested in loan disbursements) 
• frequent non-implementation - waivers, new 
programs following program failures (allows 
for paper reforms and policy reversals) 
• short term horizon (short-term, e.g. 
quarterly point deadlines) 
 
Furthermore, IMF officials assessed progress in short term perspectives at 
predetermined intervals, facing perverse incentives to overlook underperformance to keep 
programs going. As the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the Russian 
Federation Boris Fedorov put it, “the IMF was pretending that it was seeing a lot reforms. 
Russia was pretending to conduct reforms”.12 In short, it seems that the IMF, despite its 
recent attempts to do so through public discussions (Drazen & Isard, 2004), can do little to 
provide external anchoring to reform, i.e. to promote the willingness to reform when it is not 
already in place.  
Finally, higher effectiveness of European anchor has much to do with its unique 
institutional design. Opposite to membership in the UN system, Bretton Woods institutions, 
WTO and other similar multilateral organizations, joining the EU requires giving up a 
significant part of a national sovereignty in economic, political and legal spheres. The EU is a 
kind of confederation, having its own supranational legislative, executive and judicial organs 
being able to guarantee a free movement of goods, services, capital and people and enforce 
                                                 
11
 See Dabrowski and Gortat (2002) for analysis of interdependence between political and economic reforms in 
the former communist countries.  
12
 Cited in McQuillan (1998). 
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directly the acquis, something what the IMF, World Bank or WTO can only dream about. 
These global institutions might be successful only if endowed with a clearly defined mandate, 
enough resources to conduct their missions and sufficient enforcement mechanism.  
2. International trade arrangements 
Historically, centrally planned economies were isolated from international markets by 
state monopolies on foreign trade, lack of trade, investment and production autonomy on the 
enterprise level and total administrative price controls, which caused huge price and 
allocative distortions. Their bilateral and multilateral trade flows were organized on the basis 
of central planning decisions and inter-governmental transactions coordinated in the 
organizational framework of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, sometimes 
known as Comecom). Although four communist countries – Yugoslavia (from 1966), Poland 
(from 1967), Romania (from 1971), and Hungary (from 1973) – belonged to GATT, their 
membership was mostly formal due to the incompatibility of their trade and economic 
systems with other members and the obligatory character of intra-CMEA trade decisions13.  
However, when the communist system, CMEA and the USSR collapsed, GATT/WTO 
agreements did not become the dominant trade regulations in the region. In the case of 
Central Europe and the Baltics, the European Union (the European Economic Community 
before 1993) offered early on the Trade and Associations Agreements (TAA)14, going far 
beyond the GATT/WTO arrangement and including the EU membership option. In trade 
policy terms, EU membership means the full custom union with the common external trade 
policy and access to the Single European Market. 
In some cases (notably Baltic countries) TAA were signed before individual countries 
became GATT/WTO members (see Table 2). The same happened at the end of the 1990s 
and the beginning of the 2000s in the Western Balkan region in the framework of the Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe, when post-Yugoslav countries and Albania got an 
opportunity to negotiate and sign the Stabilization and Association agreements (SAA) with 
the EU15. Although signed later and including weaker EU membership guarantees than TAA, 
the SAA also was far more radical in terms of removing trade and investment barriers than 
                                                 
13
 The former Yugoslavia represented the most market-oriented trade system among the four mentioned 
countries. Its economic links with the rest of the communist bloc and the USSR was also the weakest – it had only 
‘observer’ status in the CMEA.  
14
 They were supplemented by free trade agreements with the then European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries 
and free trade zone between the future EU members themselves (Central European Free Trade Area – CEFTA).  
15
 Similar to TAA, they have been also supplemented with a network of bilateral free trade agreement between 
current and future SAA beneficiaries.  
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were WTO provisions. Again, the WTO accession of Balkan countries happened either 
contemporaneously or after the signing of the SAA.  
Table 2. Transition economies: Milestones in global and regional trade integration  
 WTO (GATT) TAA/SAA/PCA 
 
accession year 
(1st  / last 
country) 
membership 
(% of 
countries) 
signature year 
(1st  / last 
country) 
coverage 
 (% of 
countries) 
CEECs 
+Bulgaria + 
Romania 
1948/1996 100% 1992/1993 100% 
Baltic 
States 1999/2001 100% 1994 100% 
Western 
Balkans 2000/2003 60% 2001 100% 
CIS 1998/2003 33.3% 1994/1998 75% 
Source:  World Trade Organization, European Commission 
The generous trade liberalization offer of the EU led to rapid trade creation between 
the entire Central and Eastern Europe and the EU, on the one hand, and trade diversion vis 
a vis other trade partners of CEE countries, on the other (see Table 3).  
Table 3. Transition countries: geographical structure of export (in % of total export) 
  Western Europe Transition economies Others 
1995 64.2 23.1 12.7 CEE 2003 74.2 17.2 8.6 
1995 47.1 47.4 5.5 Baltic States 2003 61.4 30.5 8.1 
1995 34.1 40.4 25.5 CIS 2003 39.1 31.2 29.7 
Source: World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2004 
The CIS countries were left out of the EU integration process and even out of the 
opportunity to liberalize trade with the EU16. Contrary to Central European, Baltic and Balkan 
practice, the EU did not offer CIS countries the opportunity to negotiate and sign even limited 
trade liberalization agreements prior to, or in parallel with, their WTO accession, insisting 
instead on different sequencing: WTO accession first and only starting after free trade 
feasibility studies and negotiations. Furthermore, four CIS countries, which are already WTO 
members - Kyrgyzstan (from 1998), Georgia (from 2000), Moldova (from 2001) and Armenia 
(from 2003) – did not get a free trade negotiation offer yet and any hypothetical timetable in 
this respect is unclear.  
                                                 
16
 Apart from the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with the EU, which included limited trade 
provisions like the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause.  
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Most CIS countries have not become WTO members yet in spite of the quite intensive 
accession negotiations of some of them (particularly, Russia and Ukraine). Those who are 
already WTO members (see above) cannot demonstrate any serious evidence that their 
membership contributed to expanding their trade flows (Mogilevsky, 2004). It seems that as 
long as the biggest CIS countries (Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) stay outside the WTO, 
the benefits of smaller countries coming from their participation in the global trade 
arrangements will remain limited due to lack of regional network externalities.  
Left outside global and European trade liberalization processes, CIS countries took 
several, mostly unsuccessful attempts to build their own regional trade block (see Table 4). 
The CIS itself, among other goals (like setting the mechanism of peaceful political dissolution 
of the former Soviet empire) was to be a kind of post-Soviet common market. However, the 
subsequent multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements between CIS countries were 
never fully implemented. The same concerned more ambitious integration projects between 
smaller number of countries such as the Custom Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, later renamed into the Eurasian Economic Union (the 
Russian acronym EVRAZES17), the Union of Belarus and Russia and the Single Economic 
Space between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine (the Russian acronym EEP). Their 
failure was caused by a number of political, economic and institutional reasons: lack of 
political trust between partners, asymmetry of their economic and political potentials, 
divergence of national economic interests, various pace of economic reforms (countries such 
as Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan try to maintain, at least partly, a non-market 
economic system), the lack of effective enforcement and arbitrage mechanism and others. 
To the extent to which this ‘spaghetti bowl’ type of regional trade liberalization partly works, it 
helps very little in restructuring and modernizing CIS economies, because all partners 
represent the same development problems. In this respect CIS trade liberalization 
mechanisms cannot be considered a substitute for global or European trade and economic 
integration.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Recently joined by Uzbekistan.  
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Table 4. Intra-CIS trade agreements 
Name of organization/ 
agreement 
Date of 
foundation 
Member countries Trade aim 
Agreement on Economic 
Union 
1993 11 CIS states initially,  
Georgia joined later 
free-trade area 
Custom Union / Union  of 
Belarus and Russia / 
Union State of Belarus 
and Russia 
1995/1997/1999 Russia, Belarus integration towards 
full economic union 
Central Asian Economic 
Union / Central Asian 
Economic Cooperation / 
Central Asian 
Cooperation Organization  
CACO 
1994/1998/2002 Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
(since 1998), Russia 
(since 2004) 
free movement of 
goods, services, labor 
and capital 
Custom Union / 
EVRAZES – Eurasian 
Economic Community 
1995/2000 Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan 
(since 1996), 
Tajikistan (since 
1998) 
customs union 
GUUAM, Free Trade 
Area since 2002 
1996 Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova 
and Uzbekistan 
(since 1999) 
free-trade area,  
(counterbalancing 
Russian influence) 
Single Economic Space 
(EEP) 
2003 Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine 
free movement of 
goods, services, labor 
and capital 
Sources: I. Burakovsky, Regional economic integration as an element of economic security 
http://www.unece.org/trade/workshop/OSCE_0304/presentations/Burakovski.doc, International Economics, 
Regional Trading Agreements, http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/rta, Regional Trade Agreements, 
http://ecetrade.typepad.com/rtas/ses_rta, Central Asian Cooperation Organization, http://ecetrade.typepad.com, 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Central Asian Gateway, http://www.cagateway.org 
Summing up, in the area of international trade arrangements the former centrally 
planning economies (similar to the entire Europe) benefit mostly from regional public goods. 
The role of global public good (WTO arrangements) is marginal at the moment as the trade 
exposure of transition countries to non-EU WTO members remains limited. Those transition 
countries which have already joined the EU, or are going to join this bloc in the near future, 
have to participate in the common EU external trade policy for good and bad. Their 
economies benefit from the huge Single European Market and its four basic freedoms 
(movement of goods, services, capital and people) and from relatively low common external 
tariffs for most manufactured products. At the same time, they participate in the EU Common 
Agriculture Policy, probably the biggest global public bad in the trade sphere. Most CIS 
countries remain outside not only European, but also global, trade arrangements, continuing 
in some respects their previous autarkic way of development. The WTO and the international 
community at large can do little to change this situation.  
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3. International financial stability 
The former communist economies have experienced several episodes of financial 
instability during 1990s: high inflation/ hyperinflation in the early transition years, and a series 
of currency and debt crises in the second half of this decade. The latter involved several 
countries: Bulgaria (1996-1997), Czech Republic (1997), Russia (1994 and 1998), Ukraine 
(1998-1999), Moldova (1998), Georgia (1998), Kyrgyzstan (1996, 1998-1999), Kazakhstan 
(1999) and others18.  
Figure 9. Annual inflation rates (logarithmic scale) 
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Country grouping: see description of figure 4 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports, various issues. Unweighted average of competition policy, enterprise reform, 
banking and non-banking financial sector reform 
Inflation rates in different groups of transition countries are shown in figure 9. The 
‘Luxembourg group’ managed a gradual but swift and largely monotonic disinflation process. 
The disinflation process in ‘Helsinki group’ was disturbed by financial crisis in Bulgaria and, 
to a lesser degree, instability in Romania in 1996-1997. The Western Balkans experienced 
years of hyperinflation but later kept inflation under control. It took many years for the CIS 
countries to reduce the very high levels of inflation that followed the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Eventual disinflation occurred after the regional financial crisis in 1998.  
While the question remains as to what extent the macroeconomic and financial 
stability of an individual country depends on the quality of its own macroeconomic policy and 
financial regulations (evident NPG) and to what extent on external factors and international 
collective actions (IPG), it is difficult to claim that the international dimension of financial 
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crises does not exist at all. Empirical evidence clearly shows that the August 1998 financial 
crisis in Russia was triggered to some extent by the Asian financial crises of 1997-1998, as 
well as by serious flaws in domestic policies. In turn, the Russian crisis had a very serious 
contagion effect for other CIS countries (see Rawdanowicz, 2003) and, to a smaller extent, 
for other transition economies (EBRD, 1999). It also contributed to destabilization on global 
financial markets in the fall of 1998 and to the acceleration of the Brazilian crisis in the 
beginning of 1999.  
The IMF, as the main international actor responsible for addressing the issue of 
financial stability at both the global and the regional level, went generally in the right direction 
with its policy advice to individual countries and its program conditionality19. The IMF insisted 
on fighting inflation, keeping the money supply under control, strengthening central bank 
independence, decreasing fiscal deficits, improving financial regulation and conducting 
various structural reforms. On the other hand, looking back and with the benefit of hindsight, 
one may demonstrate a number of IMF systemic failures in relation to transition economies.  
First, conditionality of the so-called first-generation Fund programs (compare figure 4) 
launched in the first half of 1990s was generally very weak and could not prevent high or 
even very high inflation caused by high fiscal deficit and its monetary financing, avoid huge 
balance-of payments imbalances. This relates, in first instance, to the Systemic 
Transformation Facility (STF), a special window of soft-financing for transition countries 
existing in 1993-1995, under which the Fund accepted de facto inflation targets of 5 to 10% 
per month and budget deficits around 6 to 10% of GDP. This type of adjustment program 
could not help in macroeconomic stabilization in individual countries and in the entire region 
(see Dabrowski, 1998).  
Second, the IMF had problems with adopting a clear strategy with respect to the 
further existence or dissolution of the ruble area in the former USSR in 1992-1993, which led 
to serious macroeconomic destabilization in almost all USSR successor states20. Already in 
1990-1991 the State Bank of the USSR lost control over the credit emission conducted by 
                                                                                                                                                        
18
 For a more detailed analysis of currency crisis episodes in transition economies and their roots and 
consequences – see Dabrowski et al. (2003).  
19
 We do not want to neglect the important role of other organizations like the World Bank group, regional 
development banks, Bank of the International Settlements (BIS), OECD. However, their role is either 
supplementary to IMF (WB and regional development banks), or cover only certain group of countries (OECD), or 
their institutional mandate is very narrow (BIS – related to prudential banking regulations). Some monitoring role 
can be played by private institutions such as rating agencies, NGOs and research institutes but they have neither 
financial resources, nor enforcement mechanism to take the active policy steps.  
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most of its republican branches (see Dabrowski, 1997) and this situation became even more 
dramatic after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. Fifteen de facto 
independent central banks21 issued the same currency, which led to dangerous free riding 
behavior (see Sachs & Lipton, 1993). Continuation of the single currency area would require 
either very close coordination of monetary policies of new national central banks and strong 
mutual trust, or giving up monetary sovereignty of national central banks in favor of the 
Central Bank of Russia. Both variants were politically unrealistic.  
Third, the IMF was unable to prevent the Russian financial crisis in August 1998 and 
the series of follow-up crises in other CIS countries. It was closely connected with the 
weakness of the so-called second-generation Fund’s programs: Stand-by Arrangements 
(SBA) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in the case of Russia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and 
Ukraine and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility in low-income CIS countries such 
as Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Generally, there were four main type of flaws in the IMF 
programs in the CIS region in the second half of the 1990s: (1) unrealistic assumptions 
concerning GDP growth, exports, and budget revenues led to the formulation of stabilization 
programs that were sustainable only if these assumptions were realized, (2) lax conditionality 
undermined macroeconomic discipline, (3) improved access to international sources of deficit 
financing was a source of accumulation of debt while accumulation of domestic arrears was 
implicitly tolerated, (4) ineffective conditionality in the area of structural reforms stimulated 
only ‘paper reforms’ and not real restructuring of the economy (Antczak, Markiewicz, and 
Radziwill, 2003).  
Fourth, in concentrating on policy surveillance and policy advising of its members, the 
IMF often overlooks regional and cross-country consequences of individual countries’ policy 
choices. Again, the best example can be demonstrated by the 1998-1999 series of financial 
crises in CIS countries where nobody was conceptually prepared in advance to deal with the 
contagion effects created by the sharp devaluation of the Russian ruble; an event which was 
likely to happen. But even in more ‘normal’ times, IMF advice on, for example, the choice of 
the exchange rate regime does not always take into account ‘network externalities’ for 
neighbors and major trade partners22. This may be a bit surprising as the IMF’s original 
                                                                                                                                                        
20
 Odling-Smee and Pastor (2001) describe in detail the IMF position regarding the ruble zone, presenting a lot of 
internal Fund documents. They claim that the IMF was neutral with respect to two major options, i.e. continuing 
the ruble area vs. introducing national currencies. However, many experts (see e.g. Lipton and Sachs, 1992) 
considered the Fund’s position as de facto supporting continuation of the ruble area.  
21
 At the same time most of them were politically dependent on both the legislative and executive branch of the 
newly formed national governments, preferring populist monetary policies.  
22
 We think that this kind of dilemma can be observed even more in regions other than Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former USSR.  
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historical mandate was to facilitate exchange rate stability and discourage the competitive 
devaluations that damage international trade.  
Fifth, in many transition economies the IMF supports de facto intermediate (hybrid) 
monetary/ exchange rate regimes23, which proved to be particularly vulnerable and fragile in 
cases of unexpected shocks and speculative attacks (see Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1995; 
McCallum, 1999; Eichengreen & Hausmann, 1999; and others). This seems to be the 
unintentional by-product of the Fund’s recent reluctance to support ‘hard’ peg in the form of a 
currency board or unilateral dollarization/ euroization. After limited involvement in some 
currency board experiments in the 1990s (Bulgaria in 1997 was the last such episode) the 
IMF became increasingly hesitant to support this ‘corner solution,’ which can be a very 
attractive option for a small open economy with inherently limited monetary policy credibility24 
Instead, many small transition economies have been pushed by the IMF to experiment with 
independent monetary policy and more flexible exchange rate arrangements (this is true, for 
example, of the CIS countries after 1998-1999 financial crises). As many of those countries 
suffer serious credibility problems and have operational difficulties with introducing free floats 
and direct inflation targeting,25 the actual effect of IMF policies has been a continuation of the 
intermediate (hybrid) regimes, most frequently close to the fixed but adjustable peg or narrow 
band, which usually offer the worst solutions from the point of view of financial stability.  
In order to give a correct and fairly balanced picture regarding the IMF role after the 
series of financial crises in the second half of 1990s one cannot forget, on the positive side, 
the huge effort to increase the transparency of the Fund’s operations themselves (on-line 
publication of practically all country, regional and thematic reports, policy assessments, 
analyzes, lending decisions, country data, etc.), data dissemination of its members and data 
quality and comparability (the Special Data Dissemination Standard). The regular reports on 
the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) in member countries relate to such issues 
as accounting, auditing, anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism 
(AML/CFT), banking supervision, corporate governance, data dissemination, fiscal 
transparency, insolvency and creditor rights, insurance supervision, monetary and financial 
policy transparency, payments systems, and securities regulation. All these measures help to 
                                                 
23
 These are the regimes in which central banks tried to control both the exchange rate and monetary aggregates 
(or interest rates).  
24
 This probably came on the top of strong critique of peg exchange rates after the Mexican, Asian, Russian and 
Brazilian crises in the second half of 1990s. The collapse of the Argentinean currency board in 2000-2001 could 
additionally have contributed to this reservation. However, this position does not make a sufficient distinction 
between the intermediate (hybrid) regimes like fixed but adjustable peg and credible currency board or unilateral 
dollarization/ euroization.  
25
 Calvo and Reinhart (2000) call this phenomenon ‘fear of floating’.  
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decrease uncertainty, information asymmetry, herding and moral hazard behavior on the 
international financial markets.  
As the post-transition macroeconomic situation stabilizes in the region, an increasing 
number of countries no longer require the IMF sponsored adjustment programs. The Fund’s 
lending activity increasingly concentrates on low-income CIS and Balkan countries, which 
are the subject of PRSP programs. In other transition countries the IMF monitoring role has 
been gradually decreasing, being limited to regular Article IV consultations and the above 
mentioned reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs).  
On the other hand, the IMF role in the first period of transition is partly being taken 
over and crowded out by the EU. This relates to EU new member states (NMS), formal EU 
candidates (Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey) and potential EU candidates (other Western 
Balkan countries). The scrutiny about meeting Copenhagen accession criteria (functioning 
market economy) meant that macroeconomic and financial sector indicators have been 
closely monitored and signs of instability would definitely be interpreted as arguments 
against accession. Certain elements of the acquis, in particular full independence of central 
banks and an explicit ban on central bank financing of fiscal deficits, have had a direct 
positive impact on financial stability. Eventually NMS are expected to join the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and adopt the Euro26 which should eliminate completely the risk of 
currency crises and significantly reduce the risk of debt crisis (due to the EU fiscal discipline 
mechanism). From this perspective the EU fiscal rules, EMU, the Euro as a common 
currency and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) should be considered the real regional 
public goods in the area of financial stability27. In fact, in anticipation of future EMU 
membership, international financial markets already at the beginning of 2000s decreased risk 
premia in relation to EU candidates and then NMS.  
4. Prospects for regional public good delivery 
Before we draw conclusions about potential role of regional public goods, we should 
answer a series of important questions related to the future potential of a European anchor 
and chances to duplicate it in other geographical regions. Can the positive experience of EU 
accession-related external anchoring be repeated in relation to the countries, which have 
                                                 
26
 Slovenia already joined the EMU from January 1, 2007. Six other NMS – Estonia, Lithuania (from June 2004), 
Cyprus, Latvia and Malta (from April 2005) and Slovakia (from September 2005) entered the European exchange 
rate mechanism ERM-2, which serves as the probationary two years period before eventual joining the EMU.  
27
 Unfortunately, formal weakening of the SGP in 2005 and the inability of several EU members to meet the EU 
fiscal criteria (deficit not exceeding 3% of GDP and public debt not exceeding 60% of GDP) may significantly 
decrease the value of this IPG (see Rostowski, 2004; Coricelli, 2005; Tanzi, 2005).  
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recently claimed their interest in becoming future EU members (like Moldova, Ukraine and 
Georgia)? Can the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), a mechanism launched in 2004 
and directed at CIS, Middle East and Northern Africa countries, be successful if it does not 
include the EU membership prospects? Pushing the question even further, is it possible to 
emulate the European integration model on other continents? Finally, can any lessons be 
drawn for global international organizations attempting to anchor reforms worldwide?  
Unfortunately, it seems that momentum for further EU enlargements is currently very 
low. EU politicians, faced with a rejection of the Constitutional Treaty as result of French and 
Dutch referenda in May 2005 linked by many to ‘enlargement fatigue’, are unlikely to push for 
new rounds of accessions soon28. Indeed many politicians explicitly criticize treating 
European enlargement as a ‘civilization project’ and suggest concentrating attention on the 
interests and problems of current members.  
Leaving aside the assessment whether such approach is correct or wrong one cannot 
be surprised by the fact that incumbent members of the ‘club’ may be reluctant to provide an 
unlimited access to its privileges to newcomers even if the latter are ready to meet all the 
entry criteria. This is a very nature of ‘club goods’, which the European integration is a typical 
example of. Enlargement of a ‘club’ involves definitely certain costs and risks to the 
incumbent members29. In the concrete case of the EU they are related, for example, to the 
size and structure of financial transfers, adjustment costs connected with expansion of the 
Single European Market, ‘diluting’ influence of some incumbents in a decision-making 
process on the EU level and making the latter more complicated and less predictable30, etc. 
These costs might be particularly high in case of Turkey and Ukraine, which size, geopolitical 
location, demographic potential and institutional problems are considered as a serious 
challenge in some incumbent members states31. It means that future EU candidates will have 
to accept more distant and less certain ‘carrot’ and be subject of bigger ‘stick’ of potential 
exclusion. Whether such a less favorable balance of incentives (comparing to the 
                                                 
28
 See the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, December 14/15, 2006, para. 9: “The 
European Council stresses the importance of ensuring that the EU can maintain and deepen its own 
development. The pace of enlargement must take into account the capacity of the Union to absorb new 
members.” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf) Taking into 
consideration a political stalemate around the Constitutional Treaty, the EU institutional reform, allowing next 
enlargements, may take several years.  
29
 Even if potential benefits both for incumbents and newcomers overweight the enlargement costs.  
30
 However, the analysis of the potential consequences of 2004 Enlargement for a decision-making process 
seems to indicate that it did not necessarily lead to increase in the EU internal heterogeneity in terms of policy 
preferences – see Wyplosz (2005) in respect to strategic euro-integration choices and Paczynski (2006) in 
respect to inflation preferences.  
31
 In the case of Turkey cultural and religious considerations also play an important role.  
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‘Luxembourg’ and ‘Helsinki’ groups – see Section 2.1) will produce enough reform 
determination remains an open question32.  
The same question can be addressed in respect to the ENP. The lack of explicit EU 
membership perspective creates doubts whether ENP can provide sufficient external 
anchoring to domestic reform process (see Milcher & Slay, 2005). On the other hand, one 
can try to imagine an attractive non-EU-membership ‘carrot’ for the EU neighbors in the form 
of enhanced security cooperation (NATO membership and/or close cooperation with the EU 
in the foreign and security policy spheres) in exchange for respecting European standards of 
human rights and democratic institutions (the first pillar of the Copenhagen criteria) and 
access to four basic economic freedoms in exchange for economic and institutional reforms 
(elements of the second and third pillar). While the early free movement of goods can be 
considered as an important benefit and the immediate proof of EU goodwill, the ultimate 
reward likely lies in the free movement of persons. Theoretically, these benefits can be 
delivered without actual EU membership and could become a part of the ENP or an even 
wider development compact.  
Finding an effective non-EU-membership model of economic and political integration 
in Europe and in its closest neighborhood may be also important for countries, which are not 
interested in a full EU membership for various reasons, including Russia. This model could 
be based on the experience of West European countries which declined to join the EU but 
remain in a very close association with the EU (the European Economic Area in the case of 
Iceland and Norway, a system of bilateral agreements in the case of Switzerland). 
This also leads us to the question on chances of repeating the EU experience in other 
geographical regions. At the moment the unique set of historical conditions, which led to 
launching the European integration project in 1950s (a desire to overcome national conflicts, 
in first instance a Franco-German rivalry, which led to the two world wars) and then to its 
subsequent expansions (willingness of less developed countries to join a club of richer 
neighbors, and overcome geopolitical consequences of the Cold War) seems do not exist in 
other regions. Although last few decades brought a lot of initiatives of economic and political 
integration in Asia, Arab countries, Latin America and Africa, most of them failed to deliver 
the expected results. The unwillingness to give up a significant part of national sovereignty in 
order to build effective regional institutions can be considered as the basic reason of this 
failure. However, one cannot exclude changes in this respect in future. Thus, learning from 
                                                 
32
 A sharp decline of public support to EU integration in Turkey, from 73% in 2004 to 54% in 2006, while the 
proportion of opponents increased from 9 to 22% at the same time (see TT, chart 18, p. 19), may signal limits of 
such rebalancing.  
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the EU experience makes sense. These lessons may be also partly useful for global 
institutions and arrangements being responsible for delivery of global public goods.  
Summary of findings  
Our reading of the evidence is that the EU, through the enlargement process, acted 
as the regional public (club) good provider, whose influence across time and countries was 
correlated with better transition outcomes. In particular, the consolidation phase in 
democratization, institution building and structural transformation was successful in countries 
reforming under EU accession conditionality, but not under other forms of conditionality. In 
the area of trade, gains from WTO accession were dwarfed by the impact of the opening of 
the EU trading block for accession countries. Finally, countries participating in EU integration 
showed more discipline in maintaining macroeconomic stability, while IMF programs were 
less effective in inducing stability in the absence of the European factor33.  
While the evidence of correlation between EU accession and the successful reform 
process is rather clear, it is much more difficult to prove causality. Our preferred explanation 
is that the EU membership perspective is so attractive politically for the candidate countries 
that it helps to anchor effectively the entire reform process (for similar explanation see 
Mizsei, 2004 and Roland, 2005). However, other observers may argue that the membership 
perspective emerges as a result of progress in reforms or claim that some unobservable and 
fundamental factor, like geography, culture and religion can simultaneously drive both 
processes.  
These are not mutually exclusive explanations and we suspect a virtuous circle. 
Better initial conditions of some countries made future EU membership more realistic, which 
stimulated reforms through an external anchoring mechanism. Reforms in turn enabled 
subsequent stages of integration process and raised hopes of membership even more. This 
again stimulated reforms to complete the virtuous circle. The circle was reinforced by trade 
and investment integration that promoted growth, made reforms more popular and 
strengthened constituencies for further integration and accession, while obviously was itself 
conditional on progress of reforms and meeting the acquis. In our view, the incidence of 
these virtuous circles does not reduce the benefits of European integration prospects, on the 
                                                 
33
 This paper does not include the analysis of two other international public goods: knowledge diffusion and 
adaptation and managing climate stability. However, in both policy areas the regional public goods offered by the 
EU (the European Research Area and the EU environmental standards) are more effective than their global 
equivalents.  
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contrary, it makes the cost of early exclusion from the process even higher in terms of 
reforms.  
Finally, we have some direct evidence of the existence of causality from integration 
towards reform. In particular, the exogenous shift in the European integration strategy in 
Helsinki in 1999 (see Section 2.1) led to the acceleration of reforms in affected countries. 
The same effect was repeated in the Western Balkan region as result of launching the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. The open threat of exclusion of Slovakia from the 
EU and NATO enlargement in the second half of 1990s clearly triggered the turnaround in 
political developments in that country. It is also noteworthy that reformist governments in CIS 
countries that have emerged as a result of recent democratic revolutions tend to declare EU 
and NATO as their strategic goals (Georgia, Ukraine). It suggests that countries actively seek 
the external anchoring.  
In respect to promoting good governance and good policies on national level our 
analysis says that their long-term benefits should be considered by major domestic 
constituencies as realistic, understandable and widely desirable. While benefits of economic 
growth and poverty reduction are desirable and understandable, they might seem too distant 
and uncertain to strongly influence domestic reform effort. So the effective external anchoring 
of national reforms should involve the credible commitment on the part of developed 
countries and international organizations acting on their behalf to deliver attractive rewards 
(club benefits like external security and access to four basic economic freedoms), when the 
conditionality is fulfilled. To conditionality itself must be broad-based and going beyond the 
narrowly defined specific technical criteria (i.e., it must promote real democracy, rule of law 
and free market), demanding and focused on implementation, as it was in the case of the 
Copenhagen EU accession criteria. In other words, the offer consisting of honest conditions 
and irresistible rewards best summarized by the simple phrase: ‘do as we do, be one of us’, 
must be made. Such an offer is perhaps the international public good in greatest deficit 
today, also in the European neighborhood as momentum for further EU enlargement is 
currently very low and mechanisms of productive non-accession cooperation yet to be found. 
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